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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE APPEAL
1. Did the district court misread the promissory note in this case as
requiring the reconveyance of both parcels of property securing the note upon the
payment of principal amount of the note, even though the note expressly conditioned
reconveyance of one parcel upon payment of a separate obligation one of the defendants
owed plaintiff?
This issue was raised below and was the basis for motions for summary
judgment. R. 23-64 and 70-104. The construction of a contract is a legal question.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of fact exist and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
'"Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law, [this court] accord[s] no
deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal issues presented/" Salt Lake County
Cornm'n v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 985 P. 2d. 899, 902 (Utah \999)(quoting K & T
Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P. 2d. 623, 627 (Utah 1994)).
2. Did a genuine issue of material fact exist regarding whether defendant
was required to pay off another obligation before receiving reconveyance of one parcel of
property securing the promissory note in this case?
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This issue was raised below in the motions for summary judgment and the
accompanying affidavits. R. 120-128. Summary judgment is appropriate only when no
genuine issues of fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). ""Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question
of law, [this court] accord[s] no deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal issues
presented."' Salt Lake County Comm'n v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 985 P. 2d. 899. 902
(Utah l999)(quoting K & Tine. v. Koroulis, 888 P. 2d 623, 627 (Utah 1994)).
3. Did the district court err when it denied plaintiffs post summary
judgment motion to amend the complaint to allege a claim asking the Court to reform the
deed of trust to conform to the parties' intentions?
This issue was raised below by plaintiffs Motion to Amend. R. 181-191.
This court reviews decisions of a district court denying a motion to amend for abuse of
discretion. Aurora Credit Srvs.} Inc. v. Liberty West Dev., Inc., 97 P. 2d 1273, 1281 (Utah
1988). Motions to amend generally are to be liberally granted. Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Appellant does not believe there are any determinative constitutional
provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations. This case seeks proper construction
of an agreement between the parties.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Proceedings and Disposition of the Case in the District Court
Plaintiff, the Tretheway Family Trust, brought this action seeking a
declaratory judgment that it did not have to reconvey certain real property pledged to
secure a $150,000 loan plaintiff made to defendants until certain conditions in addition to
the payment of $150,000 were met. The district court granted defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment and entered its Amended Final Judgment on May 24, 2000, requiring
plaintiff to execute a reconveyance. The district court also awarded defendants attorney
fees. Plaintiff filed its Motion for New Trial on June 21, 2000, which the district court
denied on October 4, 2000. The district court also denied plaintiffs alternative motion to
amend its complaint.
Statement of Facts.
On or about January 25, 1999, plaintiff, through one of its trustees Richard
L. Tretheway, negotiated a loan to defendants Blair Nebeker and Robert Furstenau, who
were partners. R. 26; 73. All negotiations were done by and between Tretheway and
Nebeker. R. 128. The loan was evidenced by a promissory note (the "Promissory Note")
and trust deed (the "Trust Deed"). R. 92-97 and 99-104. Mr. Tretheway wrote the
Promissory Note, and the Trust Deed was on a standard form prepared by First American
Title Insurance Company, who was handling the escrow. R. 73.

Both the Promissory Note and Trust Deed stated that they were secured by
the same two parcels of real property described in exhibits to those documents. One
parcel was some apartment property (the ''Apartment Property") and the other parcel was
a gasoline station (the ;;Gas Station Property"). R. 96 and 97. The Trust Deed had one
exhibit attached, an Exhibit A, describing both parcels, R. 104, while the Promissory Note
had two exhibits attached, an Exhibit A describing the Apartment Property, and an
Exhibit B describing the Gas Station Property. R. 96-97.
The face amount of the Promissory Note was $150,000.00, and the same
amount was referred to in the trust deed. R. 92 and 99. The Promissory Note, however,
had an additional provision not found in the Trust Deed that specifically required that
another obligation also owed to plaintiff by defendant Nebeker (the ;;DiCamillo Note") be
paid before plaintiff was obligated to reconvey the Gas Station Property. R. 94. The
provisions of the Promissory Note regarding release of the property securing the note are
as follows:
RELEASES
1.
THIS NOTE IS SECURED IN ADDITION TO
OTHER SECURITY BY A SECOND TRUST DEED ON
THE PROPERTY ATTACHED HERETO AS EXHIBIT
"A." Lender will give a partial release for each condominium
[sic] sold upon the property upon the payment of the sum of
$20,000.00 per condominimum [sic] sold to the Lender.
2.
Upon the payment of $150,000 to Lender and
there has been no default in any of the payments by
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Borrowers to Lender the Trust Deed described in Exhibit 'TV'
shall be released.
3.
The first trust deed on the property described in
w4
Exhibit B" attached hereto shall be released on the payment
of the sum of $53,400.00 for the purchase of the note
Described as the Camillo note, now owned by the Tipton
Family Trust for the sum of $53,400.00 plus interest in the
sum of $5,696.00 which is interest due as of February 1, 1999
plus interest at the rate of $712.00 per month thereafter until
paid, plus any and all attorney fees paid to Paul Halliday in
the case of Dicamillo vs Tipton and Tipton vs Kathryn
Abbott.
R. 94. Exhibit A to the Promissory Note was the description of the Apartment Property,
and Exhibit B to the Promissory Note was the description of the Gas Station Property.
R. 96 and 97. The Promissory Note also provided that any conflict between the
Promissory Note and the Trust Deed would be resolved by following the Promissory
Note's provisions. R. 94.
On or about June 23, 1999, Furstenau and Nebeker paid plaintiff
$150,000.00, plus interest, and plaintiff reconveyed the Apartment Property. Plaintiff,
however, did not reconvey the Gas Station Property because the DiCamillo Note had not
been repaid. R. 88-89. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to be
paid on the DiCamillo Note before it was required to reconvey the Gas Station Property
under the provisions of the Promissory Note. R. 1-3.
The parties filed motions for summary judgment on the key issue in the
case. Defendant Nebeker filed an affidavit in the district court on behalf of plaintiff
5

admitting that the intent of the parties was that the DiCamilla Note be paid off before the
Gas Station Property was to be reconveyed. R. 127-28.. That affidavit reads in part:
5. I agreed that he [Tretheway] would not have to
release the security on the gas station until all the monies due
Tipton on the note are paid. I told him that upon payment of
the $150,000 we would get a complete release as to the
condos (to which he (Tretheway) agreed) but he would not
have to release gas station property until the
Tipton-DiCamillo principal, interest, and all attorney fees to
Paul Halliday were paid.
6. Part of the consideration for the loan of $150,000
was that the Tipton-DiCamillo Note would be paid off before
a release would be given to the gas station. Without the
agreement to pay off the Tipton-DiCamillo note Tretheway
would not lend us the money. I explained this to Forstenau
and he agreed as long as the Tipton-Camillo [sic] note would
be assigned to us upon Tretheway being paid off.
R. 127-28.
The district court, however, ruled that plaintiff was required to reconvey
both the Apartment Property and Gas Station Property upon the payment of $150,000 by
defendants.1 R. 144-48. The district court found that the Promissory Note
"unambiguously" required this result, despite the provisions of the note regarding the
DiCamilla Note, and despite defendant Nebeker's affidavit. R. 146-47..
1

Subsequently, defendant Forstenau found a buyer for the Gas Station
Property, and he and plaintiff agreed that defendant would put $70,240 of the proceeds in
escrow and plaintiff would reconvey the Gas Station Property. It was further agreed
between the parties "that nothing in this agreement shall be construed to waive or nullify
the parties rights claimed in Trethewav v. Furstenau, Case No.990908053; both parties
continue to assert their positions (as stated in the pleadings and motions)."
6

An Amended Judgment was entered May 24, 2000, after Furstenau filed an
amended affidavit for attorney fees. R. 215-17. Plaintiff filed a Motion for New Trial,
or A Motion to Amend the Pleadings seeking to include a causes of action for money
damages and reformation of the Trust Deed to be consistent with the Promissory Note.
On September 25, 2000, all of plaintiff s motions were denied and the previous amended
final judgment was affirmed. R. 254-57. The district court's ruling on these motions was
entered October 4, 2000. R. 254. Plaintiff filed its notice of appeal on October 23. 2000.
R. 267-68.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Promissory Note and Trust Deed must be considered as one agreement
and read together to know the intent of the parties. The Promissory Note provided, by
reference to the property descriptions attached as exhibits, that the Gas Station Property
would not be reconveyed until the DiCamilla Note was paid, and the Promissory Note
also provided that its provisions controlled any conflict between it and the Trust Deed.
Because the Promissory Note was drafted specifically for this transaction and the Trust
Deed did not reference the DiCamilla Note, the provisions of the Promissory Note should
control. Plaintiff should not be required to give a reconveyance for the Gas Station
Property until the DiCamilla Note is paid.
To the extent the Court believes the intent of the parties is not clear from
the Promissory Note and Trust Deed, defendant Nebeker admitted in his affidavit that
7

plaintiffs version of the facts is correct. The district court erred in not considering this
undisputed affidavit and in not entering summary judgment for plaintiff. At the very
least, the Nebeker affidavit, together with an affidavit submitted by plaintiff, creates a
genuine issue of material fact that precluded summary judgment for defendants.
Finally, plaintiffs post-judgment motion to amend should have been
granted. The undisputed affidavit of defendant Nebeker demonstrates that the parties
intended that the Gas Station Property would not be released until the DiCamillo Note
was also paid off. The district court, however, ruled that plaintiff was required by the
"unambiguous" terms of the Promissory Note to reconvey both the Apartment Property
and Gas Station Property when $150,000 was paid. Plaintiff should have been allowed,
in light of the district court's interpretation of the agreement, to state a claim for
reformation to show the true intentions of the parties were different than the supplied
''unambiguous" interpretation by the district court.
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review
Summary Judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of fact exist
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)
""Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law we accord no deference
to the trial court's resolution of the legal issues presented.'" Salt Lake County Comm 'n v.
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Salt Lake County Attorney, 985 P. 2d. 899, 902 (Utah 1999) (quoting K& Tine. v.
Koroulis, 898 P. 2d. 623, 627 (Utah 1994)).
I.

The Provisions of the Trust Deed and Promissory Note Must be
Construed Together, Considering Each Provision in Relation to the
Others.
The parties executed a Trust Deed and Promissory Note on February 1,

1999. The Trust Deed was a form supplied by the title company. The Promissory Note
was prepared by Mr. Tretheway specifically for this transaction. Because these two
documents comprise the agreement of the parties, they must be construed together.
n

[U]nder established Utah law, when two agreements are 'executed substantially

contemporaneously and are clearly interrelated, they must be construed as a whole and
harmonized if possible.'" Shields v. Harris, 934 P.2d 653 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 109 (Utah 1991)).
The Promissory Note and the Trust Deed were signed on the same day
regarding the same loan and each document referred to the other. As such, they must be
construed as one agreement and harmonized together.
II.

Contracts Are to be Interpreted So that AH Elements of the Contract
are Given Effect.
In construing the contracts, ui [t]he basic rule of contract interpretation is

that the intent of the parties is to be ascertained from the content of the instrument itself....
Each contract provision is to be considered in relation to all of the others, with a view

9

toward giving effect to all and ignoring none."' Plateau Mining Co. v Utah Div. of State
Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990)(emphasis added)(quoting Utah
Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981)).
The Promissory Note sets forth in detail how a release of the property
securing the Promissory Note could be obtained. By referencing the two different parcels
by different exhibits, Exhibit A being the Apartment Property and Exhibit B being the
Gas Station Property, it becomes clear which release provision applies to which parcel.
The first release provision applies only to "Exhibit * A'" and allows a piecemeal payment
on the obligation and a corresponding piecemeal release of the Apartment Property by
individual condominium unit. R. 94. The second release provision also applies only to
''Exhibit CA"' and allows release of all of the Apartment Property by payment of
$150,000. R. 94.
In contrast the third release expressly applies only to the property
referenced in ''Exhibit 'B,'" which was the Gas Station Property. That provision states in
relevant part:
The first trust deed on the property described in Exhibit "B"
attached hereto shall be released on the payment of the sum of
$53,400.00 for the purchase of the note Described as the
Camillo note,. . . plus interest in the sum of $5,696.00 which
is interest due as of February 1, 1999, plus interest at the rate
of $712.00 per month thereafter until paid . . .
R. 94.
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This provision, securing the outstanding DiCamillo debt by the Gas Station
Property, which was the only property described in Exhibit B to the Promissory Note, is
precise and unambiguous. Defendants were required to satisfy the DiCamillo note before
receiving a release of the Exhibit B property, or the Gas Station Property. The district
court overlooked this when it ruled that plaintiff was required to reconvey all of the
property securing the Promissory Note.
The Court, furthermore, should give particular emphasis to the provisions of
the Promissory Note. The Promissory Note is the only document actually prepared by the
parties as a statement of their intentions. 'The Trust Deed was a printed form contract.
When words are inserted in a printed form of a contract, the inserted words take
precedence over the printed matter. See, e. g., Bank ofEphraim v. Davis, 559 P.2d 538,
540 (Utah 1977); Steenburg Constr. Co. v. PrePakt Concrete Co., 381 F.2d 768 (10th Cir.
1967); and Holland v. Brown, 394 P.2d 77, 15 Utah 2d 422 (1964). While the cases cited
refer to one contract in which there were handwritten interlineations, this principle should
be equally applicable when construing two contracts together where one contract is a
form contract and the other one drafted and agreed to by the parties.
The Promissory Note also specifically provided that "If there is any conflict
between the terms of this note and the Trust Deed securing this note, the terms of the
note are controlling." R. 94 (emphasis added). Thus, the parties contemplated the
Promissory Note as the governing instrument of their agreement. As such, the
11

Promissory Note's provision concerning the satisfaction of the outstanding DiCamillo
note before the Gas Station Property could be released should control.
III.

Defendant Nebeker Confirmed the Parties Agreed the Gas Station
Property Would Also Secure the DiCamillo Note.
Defendant Nebeker confirmed by affidavit submitted to the district court

that the agreement of the parties concerning the Gas Station Property was as reflected in
the third release provision: that the Gas Station Property would be released only upon
payment of the DiCamillo Note. Nebeker testified as follows:
5. I agreed that he [Tretheway] would not have to
release the security on the gas station until all the monies due
Tipton on the note are paid. I told him that upon payment of
the $150,000 we would get a complete release as to the
condos (to which he (Tretheway) agreed) but he would not
have to release gas station property until the
Tipton-DiCamillo principal, interest, and all attorney fees to
Paul Halliday were paid.
6. Part of the consideration for the loan of $150,000
was that the Tipton-DiCamillo Note would be paid off before
a release would be given to the gas station. Without the
agreement to pay off the Tipton-DiCamillo note Tretheway
would not lend us the money. I explained this to Forstenau
and he agreed as long as the Tipton-Camillo [sic] note would
be assigned to us upon Tretheway being paid off.
R. 127-28.
This could not be clearer, and it is a statement by the party who conducted
negotiations for defendants. Yet, the district court appeared to focus on the language of
the second release provision of the Promissory Note, which reads in part that ;i[u]pon the
12

payment of $150,000.00 to Lender . . . the Trust Deed described in Exhibit *A' shall be
released/' R. 94. When drafting the Promissory Note, it appears the word "property"
was intended to follow the words 'Trust Deed/' There was no Trust Deed described in
Exhibit A to the Promissory Note, but there was Trust Deed property described in
Exhibit A. R. 96. Exhibit A contained only the property description for the Apartment
Property. R. 96. Exhibit A did not contain a trust deed and Exhibit A did not contain a
description of the Gas Station Property. Thus, the reference to Exhibit A in that release
provision, contrary to the district court's interpretation, could only have authorized the
release of the Apartment Property. The district court erred in this interpretation.
At best, the district court's interpretation suggests the release provisions of
the Promissory Note were ambiguous. That would require the district court to look to
parol evidence of the parties intention, and the Nebeker Affidavit provided clear evidence
that the parties intended the Gas Station Property to be held as security for payment of the
DiCamillo Note. The district court's decision should be reversed.
IV.

Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Should Have Been Granted.
After the district court interpreted the written agreement of the parties as

requiring the reconveyance of both the Apartment Property and Gas Station Property,
plaintiff moved to amend its complaint to reform the agreement according to the
intentions of the parties. Prior to that time, both parties argued the written language of the
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Promissory Note supported their positions. Before the district court ruled, plaintiff
believed it had no reason to plead a claim for reformation of the written agreement.
The district court denied the motion to amend. The court should have
allowed amendment because reformation of an instrument, including a deed, is
appropriate when it is clear that it does not reflect the intentions of the parties. Hottinger
v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 1984) ("Reformation . . . is appropriate where the
terms of the written instrument are mistaken in that they do not show the true intent of the
agreement between the parties.") Plaintiff submitted the affidavits of Richard L.
Tretheway and defendant Nebeker declaring that plaintiffs interpretation of the agreement
was the interpretation intended—that the Gas Station Property was not to be reconveyed
until the DiCamilla Note was paid off. R. 86-104; 127-28. Mr. Tretheway and defendant
Nebeker were the only parties involved in the negotiations of the agreement. R. 128.
Amendment was appropriate at that late stage in proceedings to allow the case to be tried
on the merits of the facts before the district court and on appropriate claims that are
supported by the undisputed facts that were before the district court before it ruled.
In Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development, Inc., 970 P. 2d
1273 (Utah 1998), the trial court had dismissed a portion of plaintiffs case then refused to
grant plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint. The refusal to allow amendment was
made without comment. In overruling the trial court's denial of the motion to amend, the
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Utah Supreme Court analyzed possible justifications for the refusal and found none. That
court wrote:
Aurora seeks to amend its complaint to state an alternative
theory of recovery. . . based almost entirely on facts already in
evidence, the court should liberally allow amendment because
the opposing party is then generally prepared to address such
a claim.
Id. at 1282.
Plaintiff sought to prove that the agreement contained a mutual mistake
because the parties intended something entirely different than what the district court said
the written documents supposedly "unambiguously" stated. Even if the terms of a
contract or deed are unambiguous, they can still be reformed if they do not reflect the
intentions of the parties. Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1392 (Utah 1996) ("where
the document is unambiguous on its face, the challenging party must present proof of
mistake by clear and convincing evidence*'). In a case claiming mutual mistake, the
court can admit parol evidence of the parties intent to determine whether the parties
actually intended something different than was contained in the writing. Warner v.
Sirs tins, 838 P.2d 666, 669 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("Parol evidence is admissible to show
the writing did not conform to the intent of the parties.")
Plaintiff presented an affidavit of defendant Nebeker stating clearly that the
parties intended the Gas Station Property to secure payment of the DiCamillo Note as
well as the Promissory Note in this case. R. 127-28. Nebeker was the only defendant
15

who participated in the negotiations with plaintiff. R. 128. This evidence was in the
record before the district court ruled on the motions for summary judgment. The district
court ignored this evidence then and later refused to allow plaintiff to amend its complaint
to state a claim for reformation.
Thus, even if this Court agrees with the district court that the Promissory
Note and Trust Deed in this case as written required both parcels of property to be
reconveyed upon the payment of $150,000, the Court should remand the case to the
district court to allow plaintiff to state a claim for reformation. The evidence is clear that
the parties intended the DiCamilla Note be secured by the Gas Station Property and that
the Gas Station Property did not need to be reconveyed until the DiCamilla Note was
paid. The intentions of the parties negotiating the deal should be given effect.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the district court and
remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this [io_ day of February, 2001.
WOOD CRAPO LLC

Larry Svjerjxins \ j
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY,
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD L.
TRETHEWAY

Plaintiff,
VS.

ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR
NEBEKER, U.P.N.L.C, and
ADVANCE PROPERTIES
INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada
corporation,

Civil No 990908053
Judge Leslie A Lewis

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.

)

RICHARD L. TRETHEWAY, being first duly sworn, states:
1.

I, along with Sandra Tretheway, am a Trustee of the Tretheway Family Trust.

2.

On or about January 25, 1999, I received a phone call from Blair Nebeker with

whom I had previously done business on several occasions.

3.

At the time of the call, Nebeker owed and was in default on a previous loan

between the Trust and Nebeker (the "Camillo" note).
4.

Nebeker requested another loan from the Tretheway Family Trust for the purchase

of a gas station.
5.

I indicated that the Trust was not willing to enter into any new agreements with

Nebeker unless the Camillo debt was also taken care of; the Trust was still making interest
payments on the outstanding Camillo debt.
6.

Nebeker stated that he and his partner, Robert Furstenau, a successful contractor,

were willing to incorporate satisfaction of the Camillo debt into a new agreement as
consideration for obtaining a $150,000 loan for the purpose of purchasing a gas station.
7.

The Trust had not previously had any dealings with Furstenau, however, Nebeker

stated that Furstenau was willing to incorporate the Camillo debt into the new loan agreement
because the profit from the gas station was expected to be significant and quick in coming;
Furstenau would receive a contract for improvements on the property as well as profits within
six months of at least $75,000.
8.

Nebeker stated that he and Furstenau would transfer to the Trust the gas station they

intended to buy an apartment complex they had recently purchased and were converting into
condominium units as security for the cash loan and the outstanding Camillo debt.
9.

Nebeker stated that the gas station would not have to be reconveyed until the

Camillo debt was satisfied.
2

10.

I indicated that the Trust was not willing to make this agreement without such a

provision assuring satisfaction of the Camillo debt.
11.

I drafted a Promissory Note that reflected the agreement we had reached.

12.

The following day Nebeker and I met to review the note; Nebeker indicated that

Furstenau wanted a partial release provision for the condominiums included in the Note as the
condominiums were currently being sold.

I revised the Note to include a partial release

provision for reconveyance of the apartment/condominium complex. (See Exhibit A)
13.

Nebeker again stated that he and Furstenau were willing to condition release of the

gas station trust property on satisfaction of the Camillo debt.
14.
15.

I gave Nebeker the Promissory Note and told him to put the deal together.
I did not prepare the Trust Deed; Defendants obtained it from First American Title

Insurance Co. who was handling the escrow. (See Exhibit B)
16.

The Promissory Note and Trust Deed were signed by Robert Furstenau and Blair

Nebeker on February 1,1999.

Throughout the negotations process I did not deal with

Fursteneau, only Nebeker.
17.

On or about June 23, 1999, Defendants paid a $150,000 loan owing on the note,

but did not pay $53,400, plus interest, to satisfy an outstanding debt, the "Camillo" note, that
was incorporated into the Promissory Note under Release Provision No. 3.
18.

Plaintiff has reconveyed the apartment/condominium complex, but has retained

the gas station property for security on the outstanding Camillo debt as described and agreed

upon by both parties in Release Provision No. 3 of the Promissory Note. The Camillo note was
a large part of the consideration for the $150,000 loan and is an integral part of the agreement
between the parties.

DATED this i 7 day of September, 1999.
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RICHARD L. TRETHEWAY

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this / /

Attorneys for Plaintiff

4

day of September, 1999.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following,
postage prepaid, this 1 I day of September, 1999.
David M. Wahlquist
Merrill F. Nelson
Kirton & McConkie
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84145-0120
/*.
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PROMISSORY

MOTF SECURED BY AflpiGNMgNT Q? NOTF AND DEED 07 H'yy.gr
BUSINESS LOAN
Amount: $150, 000 .00
Salt. Lake City , Ut.
Interest Hate:

15*

Date: February 1, 199 9

PARTIES:
Lender; Sandra Tratheway, Trustee of the Trethevay Family
Trust, dated Nay 9, 1931, whose residence and mailing address is
2013 Spring Oaks Dr. Surinoville, Ut. 84SS3 and will be referred to
as "Lender".
Borrowers:

Blair Nebeker
1212 E. MOSS
MIDVALE,

BOB

UT.

84057

PI-TONE 8 0 1

5535777

CRSTENAU
7579 S. MARY ESTER CIRCLE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

U.F. N. L.C.
1212 E. MOSS
MIDVALE, UT. S4057

PHO^JS 301 5585777

ADVANCED PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC, A
NEVADA CORPORATION
1212 E. MOSS
MIOVALS, UT, 34057 PHONE S01 5535777
BORROWER'S PROMISE:
In return for a loan We have received of Si5O,0OC.Q0
this amount will be called "principal") , ZORROVfERS promise to pay
to the order of Lender, at the above address as fellows:
PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST:
BORROWERS will repay to the Lender the principal amount cf
the loan with interest at the rate cf I5f* per year until the full
amount of the loan has b^en repaid: Interest to ceminence the 1 cay
of FEBRUARY , \S99 . The monthly payment of interest shall be nicdc:
on the first day of each and every month commencing MARCH 1, l^SS
which shall be Che sum cf $1575.00 per month on the firsc day of
each month commencing March 1, 1999 paid directly from Borrower to
Lender FULL PAYMENT:
The unpaid balance of the LOAN and any unpaid internst
shall be completely paid on or before August 1, 1999

1
Exhibit 1

PREPAYMENT PENALTY:
Even though BORROWER is noc required Co do so, BORROWER may
make ether payment:s Co pay off the loan in addition to the payments
described above without penalty.
APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS:
Any payments BORROWERS make will be used first to pay the
interest due on the loan, second to pay any penalties and the
balance shall be applied to the loan balance,
IMMEDIATE PAYMENT:
If BORROWERS fail to make any payments required by thin
Promissory Loan Note, trie Lender will have che right to demand that
BORROWERS immediately pay the full amount of che balance of the
loan and any interest chat We owe on that amount.
On payments there, is no grace period. The money to be in
LENDERS POSSESSION on the due date. " So long as the envelope is
postmarked 4 days prior to che due date of Che monthly payment it
is deemed to arrive on time. If postmarked after 4 days or ia not
sent co che correct address the dace of delivery to lender io
determined by actual delivery. Borrower in addition to all other
penalties set forth herein shall pay S2S0.00 for ^^.cn late psym^nt
en demand of Lender.
In che event Borrower fails to make any two payments,
consecutively or otherwise, when due, the interest race gees Co
21V for ail the pasc due payments and until three months three
months payments are made when due ,a When three consecutive month?
payments are made on time Che interest drops back down to 15%-. 11'
not the penalty continues uncil three consecutive months have been
paid on Cime. If there are two late payments again at any time
during the period of the loan the same applies again and the 21V
continues until che note is paid off. The 21%* rate also becomes
effective if the Borrower allows the property to go into
foreclosure or the borrower goes into bankruptcy whether voluntary
or involuntary.
{Zhe foregoing is not an extension of time to pay but is strictly
a penalty provision to get borrower to pay en time.
COLLECTION COSTS:
If che Lender must: hire an attorney co help collect any
cayments Borower required Co make by this Promissory Lean Noes, or
to*collect Che unpaid loan principal and interest, Sorrower agreeb
to pay the Lender's attorney a reasonable fee. If a lawsuit^:"
filed co collect on this Promissory Loan Note, Borrower will a - 3 ^
pay, m addition to a reasonable attorney's fee, Che Lender's court
2

r\ f> P n ^

costs .
By signing this Note, everyone who lias signed as a Borrower
understands that ho or she could be held individually and
personally responsible for repayment of the whole unpaid loan
amount, plus interest, attorney's fees and court costs. That is,
the Lender may collect the whole unpaid amount of the loan from any
or^e of us without having to collect from any other signer.
TRUST DEED
IN THE EVENT OF FORECLOSURE OR THE ADVANCEMENT OF ANY MONIES
ANY AND ALL MONIES DUE UNDER THE NOTE PLUS ALL C0S7S OF FORECLOSURE
AND/OR ANY ADVANCES OF FUNDS MADE BY LENDERS TO PROTECT THE
SECURITY OF THIS LOAN SHALL BEAR INTEREST AT THE HATE OF 2Q*n PER
ANNUM, NON COMPOUNDED,
POINTS;
Any points paid in advance "on account of this loan are
considered premiums and shall not he applied to the reduction of
principal or any interest payments.
CONFLICT: If there is any conflict between the terms of this note
and the Trust Deed securing this note, the terms of the note are
controlling.
RELEASES;
1. THIS NOTE IS SECURED IN ADDITION TO OTHER SECURITY BY A
SECOND TRUST DEED ON THE PROPERTY ATTACHED HERETO AS EXHIBIT "A"
Lender will give a partial release for each condommum sold upon
the property upon the payment of the sum cf $20,000.00 per
condeminitrtum sold no the Lender.
2. Upon the payment of $130,00 0.0 0 to Lender and there has
been no default in any of the payments by Ecrrowers to Lender the
Trust Deed described in Exhibit: "A" shall be released.
3. The first trust deed en the property described in Exhibit
B" attached hereto shall be released on the payment of the som of
$53,400.00 for the purchase of the note Described as the Camilio
note, now owned by Tipton Family Trusc for the sum of $53,400.00
plus interest in the sum of $5,69a.00 which is interet due as of
February 1, 1999 plus interest at the rate of $712,00 per month
thereafter until paid, plus any and all attorney fees paid to Paul
Halliday in the case of Dicamiilo vs Tipton and Tipton vs Kathryn
Abbott. Upon payment of same Tiptcn shall assign the note and Deed
of trust to Blair Nebeker along with any papers necessary to
transfer the case to Nebeker and- make him the Plaintiff in i?cid
case .
M

3

O'-^n;

Nebekcr will hold Tiptcn Family Trust free and harn-.les from any
damages arising out of the Dicarru.Ho note.
"BORROWERS"
Blair Nebeksr
1212 E. MOSS
MIDVALE, UT. 840

PK0N2 801 5535777

BOB FURSTENAU)
7579 S.
SALT LAX3 CITY, UTAH,

U.P. N. L.C,
121?. E. MOSS
MIDVALE, UT. 884057

PHONE 801 5535777

ADVANCED PROPERTIES i^^RNATIIONXL, INC, A
NEVADA CORPORATION -1212 E. MOSS 7 JhlJ4/- flMwU~-~~r fR£5MIDVALE, UT. 04057 PHONE 301 553577/
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Form No. 1344-A (1982)
ALIA P l a i n Language Cc*nnitrrj*r;i;

ORDER NO. 490534

DESCRIPTION

E s g i r j i i r g a t tha Socchwefct: corner of COUNTRY CLUB -SIGHTS, Plac "A11,
and r u r j i i n g thenca Korch Q°01' East: 215.79 f a s t ; t bancs South 51*02'
Ease 3<S fpeat; choice Nc+th 33*45' Wasc, 2 6 3 , 3 1 fsex t o che p o i n t crbfiginujng.
The above d e s c r i b e d p r o p e r t y a l s o Jcncwn by chs screen address of;
24£0 sas? PASisys wir, S^LT^IAKS CITY, L*IAH S4io3

//fc ^^,/5
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WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO
Sandra Tretheway, Trustee
c/o Tretheway Law Offices
2013 Spring Oaks Drive
Spnngvillc, Utaii 84663
E-490594AW
DEED OF TRUST
^WITLl ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS
This Deed of! rust, made this J _ _ _ day of February, 1999, between Blair Ncbeker, Bob Turstenau,
U P N , L C , and Advanced Property International, Inc , a Nevada corporation, as Trustor, whose address is
. FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
INSURAiNCE COMPANY, a C.Uifoniin corporation - Utnh Division, as Trustee, and Saadia Tretheway,
Trustee of the Tretheway Family Trust, dated May 9, 1991, as Beneficiary, WITNESS That Trustor
CONVUYS AND WARRANTS to trustee in trust, with p owcr of sale, the following described property,
situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Sec Exhibit A" attached and made a part hereof
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water lights, lights of way, easements,
rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, puvileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now
or hcieafler used or enjoyed with said properly, or any part thereof, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power
an authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon Beneficiary to collect and appiy such rents, issues, and
profits
For the Purpose of Securing:
(\) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date hereof m the principal sum
of S\ 50,000 00, made by Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, hi the manner and with interest
as thcic n set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or irod-fications thereof, (2) the performance of each
agreement of Trustor herein contained, (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as hereafter may
be made to Trustoi, or his successors oi assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note or notes rcoung that they
arc secured by this Deed of Trust, and (4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary under
or pursuant to the terms hcicof, together with interest thereon as heiem provided
To Protect The Security of'lhis Deed ofTiust, Tru&tor Agrees:
1 To keep s-ud properly in good condition and repau, -tol to remove or demolish any building iheicon »o complete or revere
piompl'/ and in good and workmanlike manner nny bunding .vhich imy be constructed, dam igcd or dcsuoycJ ihcrcon, to con \uy widi
all 1 iws, covenants nnd restrictions affecting siul property not to commit or permit ,v uslc thereof, not to commit suTsi or pcrnit in/ act
upon said piupcrty in violation of law to do all other act? which horn (lie chdracte. or use of said property may be rcisombiy necessary,
(he s-peulL cnumetaliuns herein not exciudu g the gcncial and if (he 'can seemed hcicby cr any part thereof is being obla ncd U the
purpu.se of financing construction of impiovcmcits on said piopciiy Irustor further agrees
(Q) TO commence construction promptly md to pursue sainc with ica>unable diligence to eomplc on in accordinc
witli plans and specifications satisfactory to Bcneliciary, and
(b) To allow. Denciiei Jiy to tnsnee* said urope-ty nt al{ Junes cJuiM,g ecns'.^ahoTra-itcw, upon picscnUlion to t of in id davit ^ u e d by Beneficiary, selling forth facts showing a default by 1 ruiiur undei >is
nu»nbc» cd par-graph, i* authorized to accept as true nnd conclusive all fae s and statements Ihci ein, and to act (hereon here uJe2 (o provide and maintain insuance of such type or'/pes nnd amounts as Beneficiary may rcquiie, on the in prove nc Us rovv
existing ur hci e idcr erected or placed on said property Such insurance shall be earned in comp tnies approved by Bcnclc dry wibi loss
pityaole c'nuses m fiworol and in (onn nccepl-tblc to Beneficiary In liie event of lo«s, Trustor shall give mmicdiate notice o Scncfieury,
who may naKc prool ot losa, md each insurance company concerned is hereby aulhon/ed and directed lo nuke pnyme H roi su« \ 'oss
diiectly to Beneficiary, instead of lo Trustor and Dcieficiniy jointly and die nsurincc proceeds or any p^it thereof maybe ippned by
Denefici iry at JLS option, to the i eduction of the indebtedness hcicby sccuicd ur to die i coloration or repair of he property dmngc i In
tlie event tluit die 1 msior ilull fad to provide ^alisiiicloiy hazaid insurance tiic Denellcidjy may pixxjrc o\\ tl e 1 rustor'i behrlf maui a ice
in favor of the licncficinry alone If instance cannot be secured by the Trustor to provide the tequued covejage, this will constitute u\
act of default undei (Jiu terms of thi* Deed of i o n i

3. To deliver lo. pay for and mnintoin ^ ^ V * ? ^ ^
as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts of title or polices ol t.tie in.u.

wrcnewals (hereof or supplements
j

thereto.
r „ - numor-J-E to affect OK security hereof, the lillc to said property, or the rights
4. To appear in «KI defend any action "[ P ^ ^
^ ° Je^e = o appearin or defend any - e h acbon or proceeding, to pay
or power, of Beneficiary or Trustee; and should D ^
^ r ° ™ ^
i n a ' w u u n b | , sum inclined by Beneficiary or r^slce.
ail costs and expenses, including cost of evidence of title and attorney s H-wS
, .n',v.i;,,» <i!,' nmncitv includinE all assessments upon
5. Topay aliens 10 day* before delinquency nil laxc. or.d —
^
X
c
S
i
*
^ p r o p e r t y ; U, pny, . h e n
water company stack and nil rent*. assessments mid charges fur water epn u <-mmt toor
io ^
o( .
f
due, .ll encumbrances, charges, and Hens with inlcrwt, «« said property oi nny part tocor, wh.e.
y
hereto; to pity all costs, fees, and expenses of tins I rust.
,„,.,,„,! KV Pcncficiarv in Its discretion, sufficient lo pay all taxes
6. To pay to Beneficiary monthly, in advance .n » ™ ' » l - » " J ' ^ ^ S S OK: same . M l become due.
and assessments affecting said property, and nil premiums on insurance Ihere.or, as ana
7. Should Tn,,or f.i, to make any payment or to do any a c t ,
^
^
^
t
S
^
^
^
^
obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and wUhoul
T ™ » ^
^
D< 6
or . ^ ^
or do d,e same in such manner and lo such extent as either mny deem " « « W 7 ' 3 ^ I U , m y a c t i on or preceding pu.yoriin B to alTecl
authorized to oiler upon said property Tor such purposes; commence, appear in.and actcm
encumbrance, charge or
,h« security hereof or the rights ur powers of Beneficiary or I nw.ee; pny P ^ ' j ^ S ^
s , L u r any liability, expend
lien which in the judgment of cither appears to be prior or superior hereto, » ^ ' » « £ ^ f evidence o f mie, employ counsel, and pay
whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem necessary therc.or, inducing co.
his reasonable fees.
. iL
t „ u H^uenci-iv ur Trustee, with interest from dnte of
8. To nay immediately and without demand all sums expended hercu, de J
^
^
, be ?ccm,d hcrcby.
expenditure nl the rate of Fiuecn Percent (15%) per nnnum until paid, and the icpn/mcnl m c o .
,1,. „ , „ m . r i dutu in the amount of $350.00. Amounts in
9. To pay to Beneficiary a "late charge" if any payment U not made on the payment dale
default shall bear interest Ht a rate of 21% per annum.
IT IS MUTUALLY AOREUD THAT:
,0. Should . i d property or any part u W be taken or damaged by «
^ ^ J S ^ S S
Z S t T £
proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake or in any other manner, ^
^
^
u[c i n ^ own name, any action or
payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option to conunencc, ^ p e a r n .n P
col , H1 ,nsution, awards,
proceedings, or lo make any compromise or settlement, >n connection w.th such Ux.ng C e n ^
I
^
damage,, rid.l* of action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies at ?. ^
°
"
"
l y n ^ m e I iny mdcb.cdness
assigned to Beneficiary, who may. after deductin 8 therefrom all .ts expenses, mclumng Oomcy s j ^ PS y
J
^
^
secured hereby. Trustor agrees lo execute such further assignments of any compensation. *w..rd.
proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require.
rr,
r •„,, „.,vnvnl of its fees and presentation of this Deed of
1,. At any time and from time to time upon wnl.en request ° ^ ^ i C i ^ ^ ^ Z ^ Z .fleeting die liability of any person
Trust and the -.ate for endorsement (in ease ^ ^ ^ ^ . o r ^ l ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
J., ^
JT
TnBlC6
for the payment of the indebtedness .secured hereby, and without releasing the mtea*. c' W
^
6
l
may (a) consent lo die making of any map or plat of said property; ( ) join in granhn ^
^
J ^
^ ony cxlcl,sioa 0,
(( f
(e) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting tins Deed o f l n i s l oi U»e l.ui ot c w r y i
A b
rett(mveyance
modilieation ofdie terms ofUlis loan; (e) reconvcy, wiUioul warranty, all « W P * 0 ^ ^
^
^ J ,
f c(f l h c
miv bo described as "die persons entitled thereto", and the rentals Uicrcm of any matter., ol tact. . na,
S ^ n = « ^ r . Trus^r agrees to pay reasonable u W s fees for any of the servees menttoned m tins par, g l apl,
,- •
i • ii^^niimianee of U\«c trusts, all ren'.s, issues, ruynlties.
12. As additional security, Trustor hereby ass.jms to Bcnel.emry. dvumg U , e « ^ ^ ° U
., T
f $|,aI1 d c f a u l l i n l h c
and profits of the property an"==Ied by this Deed of Trust and of any personal P
^
^
^
r
shall have die right to collect nil
payment of ar,y indebtedness secured hereby or m the performance of any ^
"
^
"
•
m
dl;fauU M ;ll-orc,iV:j,
such rent,, issues, royalties, and profits earned pner to default as diey beeonu. uuc and pay.o
. ^ uf ^
T a t a r ' s right to collect any ofsueh moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shad I, vedie r.^ht, wU, < r
y
^ & c | „ u, „0
property afibeled hereby, to collect all rents, royalties, issues, and prot.L, ^
^
^
.
to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any manner affect ^
^
^
^
^
^
7
aud,ority to collect the same. Nomina, contained heroin, nor the exercise of Jv. r ft by^Hcnet
lo be, an affirmation by I3encfieiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an asswmpum o. ,..L.i. j
or charge uf this Deed of Trust to any such tenancy, lease or option.

f
the right, power, and
« , „ « , ; s | i a ,i be, or be eonstrued
^ 3ubl ,rdinntion of d,e lien

U.Upon.nyder.uUbyTn^^
to be appointed by a court (Trastor hereby consenting to the appointment o Eeueficn, 7_ « sw.h
adequ/c of any security lor the indebtedness hereby secured, enter upon ^
^
™
%
^ . o d ' a p p l y Z same, lea. costs
own name sue for or oUierwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including to P ^ due^n ^
^^ ^ ^
^
and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indeoledncs.
as Bcncfjciaiy may delenniiic.
i
n Cnn oi* ejuch rents issues, and profits, or die proceeds at
14. The entering upon and Uking possession of said propeity. the colicuion o . ^ ^ ^
' o p c r 1 y i flnJ the application or i c i c l e
lire and other mstinincc policies, or cocnpcwnlinn or awoj-J.. for any taking or amngc
'*
^ t d o n e p u r b U i m i to such noiicc.

Of: '- 0 ( 1

15 The fmluieon thu p u t of Beneficiary lo ptemptly enforce any rght hereunder shall notupenite as a waiver of such right and
ll;e waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute* a waive: of any other or subsequent default.
16 Tune id ot Ihc csscr.cc hoieof Upon default by Trustor m the payment of any indebtedness secured hcicby or in the
performance of my agreement hereunder, nil sums secured hereby shall immediately become due and payable at the option of Bcncficiaiy
In the event of such default, Bencfici uy mny uxcwUlc or cause Tiustce lo execute a v/ritlcn notice uf default, and of election to ciu^c sud
property to be sold to satisfy the obligations hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for rccoid In each county wheiem said piopeity or
some part or puiect thereof is situated Ucneliciaiy also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documents evidencing expenditures
secured hereby
17 After the lapse of Mich time as may then be requued by luw following the recordation of *aid notice of default, and notice of
default and notice of s^k having been given as then remmed by law, Trus'eo without demand on Trustor, .shall sell said propeity on the
date and it the time and place designated in j»atd notice of sale cither a.s a whole or m .separate procoLs, and in such Older ILS it may detemme
(but subject tu any statutory light of 'Iru.stor In due-t die under m which Siiidi property, tf consisting of scleral known lot? or parcels, shall
be sold), at public oucuon to the highest biddei, the purchase pi ice payable m lawful money of the United States at {he time of sale. The
person conducting the sale may, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to lime until it shall be completed and, in
every suei\ case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration thcieuf by such poison at die tunc awd plnee las-l appointed
for the Tale, piovidcd, if the sale is postponed for longer than one day beyond (lie day designated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall
be given m the same mannci as die original notice of s.atc. Tnistce shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed conveying said
property so Told, but widiout any covenant of warranty, c.xptess or implied The recital* m the Deed of any mntleis or facts shall be*
conclusive pi oof of 1)70 tniliifulnesM thereof. Any poison, including Beneficiary, may bid at the sale. "IruMcc shall apply the piooecda of
die i>ale to payment of (1) the cost nnd expenses of exercising die power of sale nnd of the sale, including the payment of die Trustees and
attorney's fees, (2) cost of any evidence of tide procured in connection with such sale and icvcnuc stamos on Trustee's Deed; (3) all sums
expended under Hie terms heicof, not then repaid, with accrued mleicst at 21% per annum fiom dale of expenditure, (4) all other bums
the secured hcicby; and (5) the remainder, if any to the person or poisons legally entitled theieto, or the 'trustee, in its disci ction, may
deposit die balance of such piocccds with the County Clerk of the county in which die vale took place
1S Trustor agrees lo surrcndci possession of die heicmabovc descubed Trust property '0 die purchaser at the aforesaid sale,
immediately afle such sale, m the event .sueh possession ha.s not previously been surrendered by 'I ru>lor
19 Upon the occunence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary shall have \l\c opUon to dcclaie all -urns seemed hereby
immediately due and payable <\[\d foreclose this Deed of Trust in the manner provided by law for the foicclosuie of mortgages on real
properly and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover J I such proceedings all costs and expenses incident thereto, including reasonable
attorney s fee in such amount a3 shall be fixed by the court
20 Beneficiary may appoint n successor trustee at any umc by filing for record in the oOiee of the County Recorder ol'cueh county
in which said piopeity or .some pmt theieof is situated, a substitution of uubtcc. From the tune die substitution u> filca for re-ord, the new
trustee shall succeed to all die powcis, duties, authonly and title of the trustee named hcicm or of ouy successor tnislee Each such
rubsutuLon siiuil be executed find acknowledged, and notice thereof .shall be given and proof thereof nude, m the manner piovidcd by law,
21. This Deed of Tnist shall apply to, mure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hcielo, their hens, legatees, devisee,
administratis, executors, successors and assigns All obligations of Trustor hcieunder are jotnt and several The tain "Henefictary- .shall
mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of'die note secured hereby. In tins Deed of Trust, whenever the context 60 requites,
the masculine gender include* die feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number includes the plui nl
22. Trustee accepts tlus Tiu.st when this Deed of Irusl, duly executea and acknowledged, is made a public record as piovided
by law Truslcc is not obhgVcd to notify any paily hereto of pending sale under any other Deed of Trust or of any action or preceding
m which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless biought by Trustee
•A of Trust shall be construed according to the laws of die Stale of Utah
24 I he \iilrf J Signed Trustor i cqucsts that a copy of ajiy notice of default and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to Jum
; he/tMr-ufbre set forth

jilted liability company

Name^ £j. William Ncbeksr
Us Manager
J7irfu4u^» ^nL » a ^ c v a c ^ a corporation

Name Btau Nebekcr
[Ls President
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STATE OF UTAH

)

County of
On Uic ( -"^day of-Wua^y, 1999, A.D. personally before mo Dlnir Nebekcr,
who being by mc duly swam did suy for himself tliaL he is (he President of Advanced
Property International, Inc., a Nevada uoqsoralion and Ihnt Ihc widiin and foregoing
instrument wns signed on behalf of suid coi Duration by authority ofa resolution of its Board
of Directors and die said Blair Nebekcr acknowledged lo me ihnt corporation executed Uic
san^.
<._
« /'"

ijUtdUM Jf'.CzlL

Nctar/ Puohc

ALISHAA.WHITE

Nolaiv Public

M 0 E A S M O 0 5OUI!»

f.-ili Lake Cily. Utah 34111
My C o m m i s w n Zxonos
Sooiarrtsof 2G 2000

Slate of Utah

STATS OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

)

c av
^n ^c '
* of February, 1999, personally Appeared before mc, Blair Nebekcr die
sifirtcr of Uic foregoing document who acknowledged to mc dial he executed ihc same.

vdJU

Notary Public""" • " I

Notary Public

ALISHAA.WHITE
ttOEasMooSouih
S-'ILakiGty.Ulaha^m
S«ntdo,b«r2S 20DO

STATEOFUTAII

S(a(e of Utah

J

•ss.
)

County of Salt Lake

^ u ^ c I *^ day of Februnry, 1999, pcrsonnlly appeared before mc, Bob Furstcnau the
signer of die foregoing documcnl who acknowledged to mc that he executed die same.

DM

Notary Public

Notary Public

ALISHAA.WHITE
330 Essl 400 South
S.ifl la*<j C"y, Ulah 841 U
MyCoTOTUjionCtciros
Scnintnbor 25 7.COO

I
]

)

or Silf-W*-

County of

\&

,

21?i2-°U^ISl?__ . J

mmmi

STATEOFUTAII

""]

)

r-c-

On the J
day of jarrmny, 1999, A.D. personally before mc D. William
Nebekcr, who being by mc duly sworn did say for lumself Ihnlhc is Uic Manager of U.P.N.
L.C., a Utah limited liabilily company and Ihnl Uic wiihin ond foregoing instrument was
signed on bchnlf of said limited liability company by authoiity of a Articles of Organization
and the snid U. William Nebekcr acknowledged to me UiaL limited liability company
cutcd the same.
~
/ I \fl
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'/W^\

Al AA w

J \b?WAy
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I
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_

£L a , G of Utah

'

i

REQUEST FOR FULL RECONVEYANCE
(To be used only when indebtedness secured hereby has been paid in full)

TRUSTEE
The undersigned is the legal owner and holder of the note and all other indebtedness secured by the within Trust Deed. Said note,
sthcr willi ail other indebtedness secured by said Tnisl Deed has been fully paid and satisfied; and you ai*c hereby requeued and diluted,
payment to you of any sums owing to you under the terms of said Trust Deed, to cancel said note above mentioned, and ;il! other
Jences of indebtedness secured by said Tru.sL Deed delivered to you herewith, together with die said Trust Deed, mid to rcconvey,
hout warranty, lo the parties designated by the tenns of said Trust Deed, all of Uie estate now held by you thereunder.
DATED

il reconveyance to:

, 19_

EXHIBrT'A'

CoiTurxTidng at the Scutiieast ccn» cfLct 8, Bkxk 55, P a "A11, Sale Lake Giy Survey, in tl« cily of
Salt Lake County ofSall Lake^ SUiaofUali, and oinning thence North 54 feet; tlxnce West 165 feei;
licence South 54 fed; dience East 165 lectio the point of ComznencemenL
Aiso, rannxnxing at a point 54 feet North of the Southeast comer of Lot 8, Bkxk 55, Plat "A", Sail
Lake Cily Survey, and running theice Ncrth 28.5 fest; thence West 165 fei; lhaxc ScdJi 28.5 feel;
licence EhsL 165feetto the place of Commencement.

AND

Beginning ac the Southwest comer of COUNTRY CLU3 HEIGHTS, Plat
!t M
A , and running thence Ncrth 0c0ll East 215.79 feet; thence
South 51°02' East 345 feet; thence North 89°45l West, 253.31
feet to the point of beginning.

AFFIDAVIT
State of Utah
'County of Utah
Blair Nebeker being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and
says ;
1. I, on or about January 23 or 26, 1999 I
Trathoway with when I had done business before. I

called Dick

knew chat I was

in default on a previous obligation , the Tiptcn-CiCamillo Note. I
wanted top borrow a ?150,000.00 and offered to secure and pay off
the Tipton DiCamillo note as well. Had enough security on tha new
deal 'to insure the Tipton-DiCamiilo deal would be straightened out,
2. At that time I and my partner Bob Furstenau had the
opportunity to buy a gas station for ?343,000.00 but needed a
$150,000.00 in a hurry as there were others interested in it,
3. Fur3tenau and t had purchased a 2i unit-apartment house a
short time ago and Furstsnau had put up $193,000.00 cash down
payment. ;t would take too long to get the needed money frcm a
bank.

"We needed the money in a hurry as ws wanted to buy this gas

station before ^ny one else and the Seller needed ca3h right,
4.

I told him that as security for the loan he would have a

first position on the gas station, the sellers would take a second
as they needed cash in a hurry, and Furstenau and I

would give

Tretheway a second on the apartments.
5. I agreed that he would not have to release the security on
the ga3 station until all the monies due Tipton on the ncta are
paid.

I told him that upon

payment of ths $150,000.00 we would

get a complete release as to the condos ( to which he(Tretheway)

0^127

until the Tipt^-DiCamiUc p I i n c i p i l l ,

iat

,„8t,

and

,

u

atcor!I5y

faas to Paul Halliday were paid.
«• P«rt of the consideration for the loan of $150,000.00 w a 8
that the Tiptcn-DiCamillo Note v C u w K « „ *„ -- ^ „
v « u u would be paid ofr bafore a relaaae
-ould b . ? 1 V W
otf

as

,0 the

g a s station<

wit

^t

the Tipcon-Dicandllo not* Tretheway

t h e agrgsffisnt
would

noc

lena

^

^

ug

^

money, I explained this to Furstenua and hs agreed as long as the
Tipton Camilla note would be assigned to u 3 upon Tretheway beinc
paid orr.
7.
All negoeiation. f o r fch9 l o a n ^ ^ c o n d u c C e d h e c w $ e n
Tretheway and myself
Fu-ac»n»-r^;^ „.
• >
J
tu-stanaa did not participate in the loan
negotiations, but agreed to the stated t '
Dated

'I?

September 2 i 1991
B l a i r m»h»^ ftr

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN

to before me th-sJ^j^dSLy

NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR SAID STATS

o£ September, 1559

JEANNINE KENNED*
mtMt *mx, aw* * UTJVI
• « * ^ 0 0 3 ST* '00
yUPAAY U7 44107

rikKW u i m n i w i w v w i * *

Third Judicial District

MAR _ 2 2000
By.

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of

COURT'S RULING

the Tretheway Family Trust,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO.

990908053

vs.
ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR NEBEKER,
U.P.N.L.C, and ADVANCED
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
a Nevada corporation,
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for hearing on February 3,
2 000, in connection with the plaintiff's and defendant Robert
Furstenau's cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. At the conclusion
of the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement and
informed counsel that they would be notified of the ruling by
telephone.

Upon further review of the moving and responding

memoranda, the Court decided that a written ruling was warranted.
Therefore, being fully advised of the facts in this matter and the
applicable law, the Court rules as stated herein.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On February 1, 1999, the defendants signed a Promissory Note,
promising to repay the plaintiff a $150,000 loan.

The defendants

also signed a Trust Deed, conveying two parcels of property, an
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apartment/condominium complex and a gas station ("Trust Property"),
as

security

for

the

Note.

It

is undisputed

that

defendant

Furstenau repaid the full amount owing on the Note and requested
reconveyance of the Trust Property.

The plaintiff reconveyed the

apartment complex, but refuses to reconvey the gas station until
the defendants pay an additional $53,400, plus interest, which is
due on an unrelated Note, which the parties call "the Camillo
Note."

The Camillo Note is referred to in the Promissory Note,

but, according to defendant Fursteanau, is not secured by the Trust
Deed.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
In

his

Motion,

defendant

Furstenau

contends

that

the

defendants are entitled to immediate reconveyance of all Trust
Property

because

satisfied.

the

debt

secured

by

this property

has

been

In support of his argument, defendant Furstenau cites

Utah Code Annotated §57-1-33.1(1)(a), which provides that "[w]hen
an obligation secured by a trust deed has been satisfied, the
trustee shall, upon written request by the beneficiary, reconvey
the trust property."
The plaintiff Concedes that she has retained the gas station
property, but argues that she is entitled to do so because it is
security for the Camillo debt, which remains unpaid. The plaintiff
contends that Release Provision No. 3 of the Promissory

Note

00143
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incorporates the Camillo Note, thereby making the release of all
Trust Property subject to the repayment of the Camillo Note.
The Court disagrees with the plaintiff's position that the
scope of the Trust Deed is expanded to secure the Camillo Note as
well. To the contrary, construing the unambiguous language of the
Promissory

Note together with the Trust Deed,

leads to the

conclusion that the three release paragraphs in the Promissory Note
provide alternative means of partial payment and partial release of
the Trust Property.

However, there is nothing in the language of

these releases to indicate that the defendants had to accomplish
each one separately in order for all of the Trust Property to be
released.

Instead, the third release, on which the plaintiff

relies, never had to be invoked if the defendants chose the second
release alternative of repaying the full amount of the Promissory
Note, which the defendants subsequently did.

Under this second

release paragraph, the defendants were entitled to a release of all
Trust Property upon the payment of the full $150,000.
Furthermore, the plaintiff's argument that the Trust Deed,
which specifically states the secured debt as being $150,000,
should be read otherwise as securing $203,400 in debt, is simply an
attempt to re-write the Trust Deed, which the plaintiff drafted in
the first place. The Promissory Note and Trust Deed by their clear
and unambiguous language require the plaintiff to re-pay $150,000

o fl i L
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in order for all of the Trust Property to be released.

The

defendants having repaid this amount, are now entitled to a release
of all of the Trust Property, including the gas station.
Accordingly, the Court grants defendant Furstenau's Motion and
denies the plaintiff's cross-Motion.

The Court also awards

defendant Furstenau his attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the
provisions

of

the

Promissory

Note

and

Trust

Deed

reciprocity provision of Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5.

and

the

The Court

declines to award damages under Utah Code Annotated §57-1-38(3)
because the plaintiff retained part of the Trust Property under the
mistaken, but good faith belief, that she was entitled to do so
because the defendants had failed to pay the amount due under the
Camillo Note.

See Hector, Inc. v. United Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 741

P. 2d 542 (Utah 1987) (This section is not meant to penalize one who
honestly, though mistakenly, refuses to release or declare a
mortgage of record because he believes that there has been no full
satisfaction).

0 0!
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for defendant Furstenau

is to prepare an Order

consistent with this Court's Ruling, specifically indicating that
the plaintiff's Complaint against the defendants is dismissed.
Dated this _£_day of March, 20(50).

£E£LIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

'AT L-PS-rtr*

00I4S

David M. Wahlquist (#3349)
Merrill F.Nelson(#3841)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendant Robert Furstenau
60 East South Temple. Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

~OT\C^\L-

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of the
Tretheway Family Trust,

AMENDED FINAL JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 990908053

ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR
NEBEKER, U.P.N.L.C, and ADVANCED
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC., a
Nevada corporation,

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for hearing on February 3. 2000, on the parties' crossmotions for summary judgment. After hearing oral argument and reviewing the papers filed b>
the parties, the Court issued its Ruling on March 2, 2000. Pursuant to that Ruling, the Court
hereby orders as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment is denied.

2.

Defendant Robert Furstenau's Motion For Summary Judgment is granted in part

and denied in part as follows:

I

a. plaintiffs complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice;
b. the Court hereby declares and orders that for the reasons set forth in the
Court's Foiling referenced above, that certain Deed of Trust With Assignment of Rents recorded
on February 1, 1999 as Entry No. 7241865 in Book 8245, Page 4727 of the Official Records of
the Salt Lake County Recorder is void, deemed reconveyed and of no funher force or effect as a
lien or other encumbrance on the real property located in Salt Lake County described as follows:
BEGINNING at the Southwest comer of COUNTRY CLUB
HEIGHTS - PLAT A, according to the official plat thereof, filed in
Book "J" of Plats at Page 82 of the Official Records of the Salt
Lake County Recorder, and running thence North 0°01' East
215.79 feet; thence South 51°02' East 345.00 feet; thence North
89°45' West 268.31 feet to the point of BEGINNING
and further orders plaintiff to execute and deliver to defendant within ten (10) days from the date
of this Final Judgment a request for full reconveyance of said Deed of Trust and Assignment of
Rents in form and content sufficient to authorize the trustee therein to execute and record a deed
of full reconveyance of said Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents;
c. the Court hereby awards Robert Furstenau costs and attorneys fees incurred in
this matter in the amount of $11,220.00 which shall be paid by plaintiff to Robert Furstenau
within ten (10) days from the date hereof; and
d. the Court denies Robert Furstenau's motion to the extent it seeks damages
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-38(3) for the reasons set forth in the Court's Ruling.

2

3.

This Final Judgment resolves all outstanding issues in this case.
Dated this

day of April, 2000,
BY THE COURT

Honorable Leslie A. Lewis
District Judge

•J ' ' -

i

J
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SALX LAKE COUNTY
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
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SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of
the Tretheway Family Trust,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO.

990908053

vs.
ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR NEBEKER,
U.P.N.L.C., and ADVANCED
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
a Nevada corporation,
Defendants.

A Notice to Submit has been filed, pursuant to Rule 4-501,
Code of Judicial Administration, in connection with the plaintiff's
Objection to Affidavit

for Attorney

Fees and Filing of Final

Judgment. Having reviewed the moving and responding memoranda, the
Court rules as stated herein.
The

plaintiff's

Objection

is

first

directed

towards

the

Affidavit of Attorney's Fees filed by Mr- David M. Wahlquist,
attorney for defendant Furstenau.

The plaintiff contends that the

Affidavit does not adequately describe the nature of services
performed

by Mr. Wahlquist.

In response

to the

plaintifffs

concerns, Mr. Wahlquist has filed a Revised Affidavit of David M.
Wahlquist.

The

Court

determines

that

the

Revised

Affidavit

describes the services performed with sufficient specificity.

The

nno1r
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Court therefore overrules the plaintiff's Objection with respect to
the itemization of services.

In addition, having reviewed the

Revised Affidavit, the Court determines that the attorney's fees
requested are reasonable and necessary, given the complexity of the
issues involved and the need for counsel to review not only the
parties' present dealings (and the documents involved), but also to
consider and delve into the parties' prior dealings. Accordingly,
the Court overrules the plaintiff's Objection. The attorney's fees
sought are granted.
Next, the plaintiff Objects to the fact that the Final
Judgment is inconsistent, in declaring the Trust Deed void and
still ordering the plaintiff to reconvey it within ten days.

The

Court agrees with defendant Furstenau that while reconveyance may
technically be unnecessary, given the Court's ruling that the Trust
Deed has no force or effect, it would nevertheless provide a
definitive passage of the title free and clear of the Trust Deed.
Accordingly, the plaintiff's Objection on this basis is overruled.
Finally, the plaintiff objects to the Final Judgment because
of an inconsistency hJetween the amount of fees and costs specified
in the Final Judgment and the amount set forth in Mr. Wahlquist's
Affidavit.

Defendant Furstenau recognizes this error and has

furnished the Court with an Amended Final Judgment which accurately
reflects the fees sought under the Revised Affidavit.

The Court

n n 91 n
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sets aside the Final Judgment entered on March 22, 2000, and enters
the Amended Final Judgment, which the Court executed on a date
contemporaneous with this Court's Ruling.
This Ruling will stand as the Order of the Court, overruling
the plaintiff's Objection in the entirety.
Dated this "T^'day of May, 2a00.

JESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, this 27

day of May,

2000:

D. David Lambert
Leslie W. Slaugh
Kenneth Parkinson
Attorneys for Plaintiff
12 0 East 300 North
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
David M. Wahlquist
Merrill F. Nelson
Attorneys for Defendant Furstenau
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145-0120

y f 7//'/j/6 £naA£
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FILEDDiafRJCT COURT
Third Judicial District

OCT 0 4 2000
SALT LAKE COUNTy
By^/Deputy

Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of
the Tretheway Family Trust,
Plaintiff,

COURT'S RULING
CASE NO.

990908053

vs,
ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR NEBEKER,
U.P.N.L.C, and ADVANCED
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
a Nevada corporation,
Defendants.

Before the Court is the plaintiff's Motion for New Trial,
Motion to Amend Ruling or in the Alternative to Amend Complaint,
The parties appeared in Court, and counsel argued on August 31,
2000,

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter

under advisement to further consider the arguments, the relevant
case law and statutes and the written submissions of the parties.
Since taking the Motions under advisement, the Court has had an
opportunity

to

consider

or

reconsider

the

law,

all

pleadings, facts and the oral argument in this case.

relevant
Now being

fully advised, the Court enters the following Memorandum Decision.
In its Motion, the plaintiff contends that the Court should
reconsider its Ruling of March 2, 2000, wherein the Court granted
defendant Robert Furstenau's Motion for Summary Judgment.
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to the plaintiff, summary

judgment

is

inappropriate

because there are two issues of material fact which the Court
alluded to in its Ruling which would preclude summary judgment from
being granted.

Specifically, the plaintiff

contends that the

Court's reference to the plaintiff's having drafted the Trust Deed
and its statement that "according to defendant Furstenau," the
Camillo Note was not secured by the Trust Deed constitute two
disputed matters of fact which the Court should not have resolved
as a matter of law.
With respect to the first point, the Court agrees with
defendant Furstenau that the reference to authorship was merely in
passing and was not material to the Court's ruling, which was based
on the plain, unambiguous language of the Note and Trust Deed.
Moreover, the Court was not improperly resolving a dispute when it
restated defendant Furstenau's legal position that the Camillo Note
was not secured by the Trust Deed.

Whether the Note was secured by

the Trust Deed was the central question of law presented to the
Court by the parties' cross-Motions for Summary Judgment.
Court's

resolution

of this legal

The

issue in favor of defendant

Furstenau did not require a factual assessment because the Court
looked strictly to the plain language of the documents involved,
without regard to extrinsic evidence.

The Court remains convinced

of the correctness of this decision and again determines that there

0^55
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are no genuine issues of material fact concerning the fact that the
Promissory Note and Trust Deed required repayment of $150,000 in
order for all of the Trust Property to be released.

Accordingly,

the plaintifffs Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
Next, the Court considers the plaintiff's Motion to Amend.
Amendment is in the Court's discretion and not a matter of right,
at this juncture. The Court determines that the plaintiff's Motion
is untimely, having been filed only after the Court had disposed of
all of the legal issues raised in the parties' cross-Motions for
Summary Judgment.

Moreover, the proposed amendment does not raise

any new claims which appear to be legally viable.

Specifically,

the plaintiff's new theory of reformation is not applicable in this
case

because there does not appear to be any evidence of mutual

mistake.

Defendant Furstenau has consistently maintained that he

understood and intended to sign a Note for $150,000, but not to be
responsible for repaying or by signing any note agreeing to pay,
$203,400, which represents the addition of an unrelated debt which
is not the subject of the Note or the Trust Deed.
Affidavit).

(See Furstenau

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the plaintiff's

proposed Amended Complaint is untimely and legally insufficient and
therefore denies the Motion to Amend, in its discretion.
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This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court,
denying the plaintiff's Motions.

No further Order in connection

with these Motion will be necessary.
Dated this

f>Q

day of September, 2000.

LESLIE A. LEWIS .. ^
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

O n ^. cr f"

